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The very nature of space exploration implies "doing that which has never 
been done before." As such, the resources needed to meet the objectives of 
such a grand endeavor, if available, are extremely scarce. Every mission since 
the birth of the space programme has been resource limited. To overcome these 
scarcity or resource issues, natural laws developed in economics can be used. 
Such economic systems, which are referred to as market-based systems, are 
based on the laws of supply and demand. Supply and demand knowledge 
reveals true information about users needs for resources. This information 
removes the need to appeal to a higher authority or multiple meetings to resolve 
over subscription issues.
The nature of this research programme was to apply a market-based 
system to a varied set of planetary exploration resource allocation problems. In 
the past, resource constrained problems were solved through the use of many 
engineers and a large number of "working" meetings. The approach was 
successful but was exceedingly time-consuming, labor-intensive, and very 
expensive. The questions addressed in this work were,
1. Could a market-based approach solve space exploration allocation 
problems, and
2. What were the limits of the type of problems that could be solved? 
Prior to this research, only one attempt had been made to apply a market-based 
system to a space exploration problem. The work was performed in 1991 to 
solve the over subscription of mission requests for Deep Space Network (DSN) 
antennas. [1] The work was never approved to move from the experimental 
phase into an operational environment. The research described in this overview 
was based on the DSN attempt and then extended to many different types of 
problems. This overview will discuss the application of this technique to the 
following four projects:
1. Development of the instrument payload for the Cassini mission to 
Saturn;
2. Manifest of Space Shuttle Secondary payloads;
3. Allocation of spacecraft time for RADAR observations during Earth 
orbital operations; and,
4. Manifest of Space Shuttles, which are destined for the International 
Space Station.
Results from this research prove that market-based systems can solve 
resource over-subscription issues faced during development and operations of 
planetary spacecraft missions. In addition, the application of economic principles 
represents a unique and innovative approach to solving spacecraft resource 
issues and has been incorporated into the set of management tools available to 
solve issues in a quicker, cheaper and faster environment.
I. Introduction
Over-subscription of resources associated with planetary exploration 
missions have in the past been solved by two different methods, a "committee- 
driven" and a "serial dictator" type of process. In a committee-driven process a 
group of scientist and engineers are given a problem where resources are over- 
subscribed. Their approach for solving the problem involved a series of 
meetings, followed by a series of appeals followed by more meetings.
In general, committee-driven approaches take a large number of 
individuals, multiple meetings to identify possible solutions, and a large number 
of hours to obtain a compromise solution. As in any compromise, those that get 
the resources are satisfied with the result, those that don't, are not. This 
approach also provides the incentive for individuals not to be forthright about 
their resource needs. Individuals realize that since the system is over- 
subscribed, they will always get less than they request. As such, some 
individuals adopt the strategy of asking for more than required in hopes that the 
allocation is close to their needs. This strategy aggravates an already difficult 
situation.
An alternate method, known as the serial dictator method (also known as 
a simple draft), requires an independent educated individual (or group) to collect 
requests from multiple users. It is then up to the dictator to determine the value 
of the requests based on limited information provided from the users and then to 
assign an allocation that returns the greatest value to the mission. This approach 
has the major shortcomings that the serial dictator does not have all the 
information that the users have or the knowledge of the compromises that can be 
made. The serial dictator has to determine what is "fair" and what has the 
greatest value to the mission with only partial data.
Both a committee-driven and a serial dictator approach are examples of a 
command economy. A command economy has at its roots a "governing body" 
establish which resources are available, the importance of those resources, and 
who should receive said resources. Thus by design, command economies are 
centrally planned, are relatively easy to implement, and are free from market 
forces. Unfortunately this type of economy is unable to provide any information 
about the relative importance of one particular resource over another. This is in 
stark contrast to a market economy, which has the interaction of individuals 
establish which resources are needed, the level of demand for particular 
resources, and who should receive these resources.
The question is, can another process be found that produces the same 
caliber of results with a smaller workforce and in a shorter amount of time? The 
answer to this question is yes, and a market-based system will be shown to be 
that process.
II. Market-based Systems
Market-based systems are systems that use the economic forces of 
supply and demand to obtain a user's true value for a given set of resources. To 
set up a market-based system, an economy must first be created. To do this, 
three quantities must be defined a) a currency and how it is used, b) the 
resources to be allocated, and c) the rules for making and keeping track of
trades. [2] In this system, users express their demand for resources by making a 
"bid." A bid is defined as a request for a specific amount of resources in 
exchange for a specific amount of currency. During our research programme, 
the unit of currency was called "points." User where allocated points at the start 
of each experiment and were free to bid as few or as many as they desired to try 
to acquire resources. At the end of each experiment users were allocated a new 
budget of points.
To examine the properties of a market-based system versus the current 
systems, experimental economics was employed. Experimental economics 
uses a laboratory setting to test the performance and characteristics of individual 
behavior in a particular environment. An analog of an Experimental Economist's 
laboratory is an Aeronautical Engineer's wind tunnel. In both cases a controlled 
environment is used to test a predicted behavior against actual results. For a 
more detailed description of market-based system methodology, see Smith 
(1982) [3], Ledyard, et. al. (1994) [4], and Plot (1994) [5].
In the laboratory, experiments were performed which varied initial 
conditions to observe the resulting outcomes. In this way, experiments were set 
up that modeled the current system for allocating resources. Results from these 
experiments were compared with alternate approaches. The main components 
of these experiments were the:
a) Definition of what is to be allocated (i.e., the type, level, and timing of 
resources that are in demand by users to meet their goals),
b) Establishment of individual incentives (i.e., motivations for decisions to 
be made), and
c) Definition of the process by which resources are allocated to individuals 
(this includes all the paperwork, accounting, and information systems 
required to make the process "real)."[6]
An interesting challenge of the experiment design was to determine the 
rules for ending each experiment. An experiment was the unit of time in which 
resources were allocated and was known as a planning period. If a planning 
period ended at a specific time, all users would have the incentive to wait until
the last minute to make their bids. This bidding approach keeps the bids low and 
rewards those users that were quick rather than promoting the highest value 
bids. Alternatively, the system could be designed with a random closing time. 
Unfortunately, this type of closing rule can produce the undesirable result of a 
premature closing before all users can submit bids.
For our planning periods, we used a "popcorn" model approach. That is, 
as long as the market was "popping" (i.e., bids were being submitted), the market 
stayed open. Each planning period was divided into an unspecified number of 
rounds. A round was the unit of time bids could be submitted. Each round had a 
fixed duration and closed at a specific time. Upon closing, the algorithm 
calculated the number of points bid for that particular round and then began a 
second round. When the second round closed and a point total calculated, a 
third round was initiated if, and only if, the point total bid for round two was 10% 
greater than round one. Thus, a new round n+1 would only be initiated if round n 
had a point total TBD% greater than round n-1. Though the percentage increase 
could be set at any value, for our experiments, the percent increase was set at 
10%.
This stopping rule had the desired effect. As long as users were upping 
their bids, addition rounds would be initiated and the planning period stayed 
open. Once the bidding slowed, the value of the round would only represent a 
marginal improvement over the previous round. If the bidding provided a result 
that was less than 10% greater than the previous round, the planning period 
closed. The final result represented the best allocation of resources based on 
user input.
Market-based systems can be divided into two types; property-rights and 
an after-market system. In a property-rights system, users have currency but do 
not "own" any resources. This system is used to establish ownership. Once 
property-rights have been established a second type of market-based system, 
known as an after-market, is employed. In an after-market system, users trade 
resources they own for resources that they need. This system is nothing more 
than a formalized barter system. Economic models indicate that a property-right
system or an after-market system (after the initial allocation of resources has 
been performed) may be used, but employing both yields the best results. 
Though we have not run the experiment, it is believed that cases can be found 
where the initial manual allocation of resources is done so poorly, that an after- 
market system alone cannot correct the deficiency.
Conclusions presented in this overview come from both experimental 
results and an actual application of a market-based system to a space 
exploration allocation problem. Experimental results were obtained by using 
graduate students in specially designed experiments. Student preferences were 
induced using monetary incentives that were controlled and represent the type of 
demands that may be present in the actual environment. [7] Students would be 
paid a greater amount if they were successfully able to acquire resources for 
their highest priority items instead of for their lower priority ones.
From history we see that market-based systems are not new. They have 
been used for thousands of years. They began when the first humans traded 
things they owned for things they wanted from others. However, modern day 
applications of market-based systems can also be seen in such varied systems 
as scheduling MBA job interviews at the Chicago Business School, controlling 
smog emissions with Southern California's RECLAIM system, and the allocation 
of FCC Personnel Communications Service Licenses. The challenge 
experienced during this research programme was convincing the science and 
engineering communities that a market-based system could solve THEIR 
allocation problems.
III. Development of Instrument Payload for Cassini
In the early 1992 the CRAF/Cassini mission faced a difficult situation. 
Both the Comet Rendezvous & Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission and Cassini, the 
Saturn orbiter, were being built together to save funds. Unfortunately cost 
growths continued which resulted in NASA having to cancel the CRAF mission. 
The cancellation of CRAF increased the cost of the Cassini mission due to the
loss of cost sharing between the two missions. Inaddition, with tight budgets and 
the prospect of future resource growths, Cassini could have faced the same fate 
as CRAF. A better approach for controlling mass and cost had to be found, 
particularly in the area of the science payload. Cassini's science payload 
consisted of twelve "state-of-the-art" instruments budgeted at approximately $200 
Million.
Historical data from past missions indicated that instrument cost growths 
were never random. That is, a decrease in an instrument's final cost over its 
initial estimate was usually never seen. In fact the cost growths were always 
positive and could be well over 200% initial estimates. If cost growth were truly 
random, cost decreases as well as increases should have been seen.
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MVM = Mariner Venus/Mercury (1973)
TOPEX = Topography Experiment/Poseidon (1992)
UARS = Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (1991)
GGS = Global Geospace Science (Wind and Polar)
GRO = Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (1990)
MO = Mars Observer (1992)
MAG = Magellan (1989)
GOES = Geosynch. Operational Environ. Satellite
In figure 1, Polk (1994) shows the percent increase in Program cost from 
Phase C (i.e., during development) as compared to the actual cost. [8] Though 
it is difficult to tell the source of all of the increases (e.g., launch delays, damage 
during assembly, booster manufacturing problems, etc.), the data shows that 
costs growths are always positive. As an example of this, notice that the 
Magellan (MAG) RADAR payload grew by 105% during the time between its final 
design and the final assembly of the instrument.
In desperation, the Cassini Project decided to employ a market-based 
system for controlling instrument mass, power, data rate, and cost. This system 
was an after-market type of system since initial resources had been formally 
negotiated with each Science Investigator. Their negotiations are documented in
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their "Letter of Agreement", signed in 1992 and recorded in the Project's Policies 
& Requirements Document. [9]
To insure that a market-based system would have a chance to succeed, 
the Project adopted the relatively strong position that no additional Project 
resources would be used to save any instrument that was having resource 
difficulties; and that no instrument was immune from being removed from the 
spacecraft. The only option available to the Instrument Development Managers 
experiencing development problems was to trade resources.
To facilitate trades of many interrelated resources, an organized exchange 
was designed and implemented. This system, known as the Cassini Resource 
Exchange (CRE), and allowed Instrument Development Managers to submit 
requests for resources in exchange for others. As an example, the Imaging 
Science Instrument Manager could submit a request for dollars in exchange for 
kilograms of mass, if the imaging instrument was running out of dollars but was 
coming in lighter than expected. The advantage of this computerized system 
was that it allowed Instrument Managers to "package" bids. That is, if an 
instrument needed more power in a number of modes (i.e., 1 additional watt in 
Mode A, 3 watt in Mode B, and 2 watt in Mode C) in exchange for $12 K in Fiscal 
Year 1995 (FY95) and $13 K in FY96, the system could find it if such a 
complement request existed. The system could also find "chains." If Instrument 
Manager A was trading power for mass and Instrument Manager B was trading 
mass for dollars, the system would find the Instrument Manager who was trading 
dollars for power to complete the chain, if one existed.
The Cassini Resource Exchange went on-line in 1993 and was available 
to any Instrument Manager until early 1995. During that time 29 successful 
trades were made, all but two involved dollars and mass. In retrospect, even 
though the CRE could evaluate trades that involved multiple instrument 
operational modes for power and data rate, the complex nature of these bids 
made it too complicated for the Instrument Managers to consider.
Once the system closed in 1995, tables were generated to compare initial 
and final instrument mass and costs. Figure 2 shows the twelve instruments with
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their initial cost estimates, as specified in their Letters of Agreements, as 
compared to their final costs. Though some instrument costs increased, some 
actually decreased. The overall cost growth for the entire science payload grew 
by less than 1%. [10]
Figure 2. Cassini science instrument's cost growth.
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CAPS - Cassini Plasma Spectrometer
MIMI - Magnetospheric Imaging Instrument
CDA - Cosmic Dust Analyzer
RADAR - Cassini RADAR
CIRS - Composite Infrared Spectrometer
RPWS - Radio and Plasma Wave Subsystem
INMS - Ion and Neutral Mass Spectrometer
RSS - Radio Science Subsystem
ISS - Imaging Science Subsystem
UVIS - Ultraviolet Imaging Spectrograph
MAG - Dual Technique Magnetometer
VIMS -Visual and Infrared Mapping Spectrometer
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The results were even better for mass. Figure 3 shows that the overall 
mass growth for the science payload decreased by 7%! [11] Instrument 
Managers were able to return mass back to the spacecraft subsystem. The cost 
and mass of the science payload did not grow since there were not excessive 
demands for those resources. Demand (and the associated growth) was kept 
low since all instruments did not experience growth in the same areas. As such, 
Instrument Managers were able to trade those resources that were in excess for 
those in need.
Figure 3. Cassini science instrument's mass growth.
Investigations
A surprise produced by the CRE was the ability to have a "mass auction." 
The electrical antennas for the Radio & Plasma Wave Subsystem (RPWS) had to 
be moved from the spacecraft bus to the end of the Magnetometer Boom for 
spacecraft stability reasons. The impact of the move was that the RPWS team
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was going to need either an additional 14 kg of mass plus $326 k for the thicker 
1.125" diameter antennas or zero mass plus the $626 k for the new 0.75" 
antennas. The problem was that the Spacecraft Development Office (SDO) did 
not have the funds to pay for the thicker antennas that were desired by RPWS. 
Fortunately they did have excess mass.
The solution was to hold a mass auction. The SDO gave RPWS team 14 
kg and then offered mass to the highest bidder to raise the $326 k. The auction 
accepted "blind" bids from any science team that needed additional mass. 
Teams submitted bids in the form of X kg. at $Y/kg. The bids were opened by 
the Project and arranged in descending order according to the highest $Y/kg. 
Mass was sold until the required funds were raised.
The auction produced 10 bids requesting more than 20.4 kg of mass. The 
average bid price was $46 k/kg. The Project sold 4.63 kg at an average price of 
$70.35 k/kg. [12] The result was that RPWS got the thicker antennas and the 
other instrument teams were able to increase their mass allocations to solve their 
development issues.
The CRE was not without problems. Though the system was 
"computerized", virtually all Instrument Managers made their requests via e- 
mails. It was up to the Project to enter their requests into the CRE to find 
successful trades. It is hoped that the growing influence of the World-Wide Web 
and the increased familiarity with browsers would enable future users to input 
into the system themselves.
Another flaw was the lack of a connection between the Development 
Phase and the Operational Phase of the mission. NASA does not currently allow 
resources to move from development to operations. When eleven of the twelve 
instruments were completed, the incentives to trade with the struggling 
instrument vanished. If, on the other hand, a user could trade operational 
budgets, an incentive might be created to help a struggling instrument in 
development in exchange for some of their funding in operations. Currently any 
excess development funding was used to augment an instrument's operational
15
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such a system indicated that an after-market approach was a viable approach 
and should be considered for future space-related issues. The next question 
was, would a market-based property-rights type of system also be as equally 
useful?
IV. Manifest of Space Shuttle Secondary Payloads
Building upon what was learned from the CRE, a property-rights 
application for manifesting Space Shuttle secondary payloads was approved by 
NASA's Office of Space Utilization. The task was to determine if an electronic, 
market-based system could reduce the time required to manifest Space Shuttle 
secondary payloads while still producing the same caliber of manifest. 
Secondary payloads are those payloads that are stored in the middeck lockers 
on Space Shuttles. These payloads can be no larger than 44 cm wide by 25.4 
cm high, have a maximum mass of 24.5 kg and may not require more than 130 
watts on orbit. [13]
The work to address the manifest problem began in the summer of 1996 
when a series of economic experiments were designed and implemented. [14] 
The challenge was to design a system that could perform as good as the current 
approach but be more efficient as the current system. In the current approach, 
users from the various NASA organizations submitted requests for the number of 
lockers and supporting resources needed to accommodate their payloads. Once 
submitted, the users had to wait for a second group of individuals, known as 
manifestors, to produce the list of payloads that would be accommodated by the 
upcoming shuttle flights.
Initial NASA requirements indicated that a simple application of the DSN 
market-based property-rights system would not suffice. NASA had a concern
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that the highest priority payloads may never get manifested with a market-based 
system. This could result if two lower priority requests, each using half of the 
resources (requested by the highest priority payload) and if the sum of the two 
lower priority payload bids was higher than the single highest priority bid. As an 
example, if a user bid 200 points for one locker (for what NASA considered the 
highest priority payload), a market-based system would always select two other 
payloads if their combined bid was for 201 points (e.g., 101 and 100 points), or 
higher and if they both requested only half a locker. As such, the highest priority 
payload may never get launched.
To solve this problem, the market-based system was designed with three 
priority classes. User would define their payload, assign a priority class, and 
then specify a bid. The algorithm first manifested the shuttles with just the 
priority class 1 payloads. Once complete, the system would attempt to fill the 
remaining resources with any of the priority 2 payloads. The algorithm would end 
after attempting to fit any priority 3 payloads into the remaining resource 
envelope.
The use of priority classes addressed NASA's concern but decreased the 
efficiency of the system. The relatively arbitrary nature of having classes placed 
another variable on the problem such that it moved the solution away from an 
optimum. But was the solution obtained by this system better than what could 
have been done with only manifestors?
The metric used to evaluate one manifest as compared to another was to 
sum the science value of the payloads of both the simple ranking and market- 
based manifests. The manifest with the greater science value was deemed 
"better" than the one with the lower value. Prior to running the first experiment, 
users at NASA Headquarters assigned the science value for each payload. The 
actual values assigned were not as critical as the fact that different payloads had 
different values. If a NASA manager assigned the same value for each of their 
payloads, the values would indicate that the manager had no preference of which 
payload to manifest first. As such, the manifestors and the market-based 
algorithm would always select the payload with the least resource requirements
17
since it was the easiest to manifest. A science value, assigned to payloads was 
only needed for experiments and would not be needed for an operational system. 
The values only provided preference information for the students as to which 
payloads to submit bids for. Students were paid according to the overall science 
value of their payloads that were successfully manifested. In an operational 
system, the incentives to bid correctly is the user's desire to produce scientifically 
significant results from their "best "payloads.
Science value also provided trade-off information. Trade-off information 
took the form of users accepting multiple lower priority payloads over their 
highest priority payloads. With a simple ranking approach manifestors simply 
started with a user's highest ranked payload and tried to accommodate it into the 
manifest. However, using this simple ranking approach, a manifestor would 
never consider using request number two and three if request one "fit" but 
precluded those other requests. Trade-off information might lead a planner to 
select a very different set of payloads.
As an example, using the data in table 1, a manifestor would first 
incorporate MGBX-01 since it was a priority one payload. The manifestor would 
than try to incorporate either CGBA-04 or CPCG-07 since the Microgravity user 
did not specify a preference as both payloads have a priority of two. Once both 
number two ranked observations were either incorporated or discarded (if it did 
not fit into the remaining resources); the manifestor would attempt to incorporate 
the CPCG-08 or PCG-TES-02. The simple ranking approach has no knowledge 
of a user's true preferences and as such lacks trade-off information.









































With a market-based system students bid according to the science value 
since the higher the payload's science value incorporated into the manifest, the 
greater the students would be paid. This type of behavior, selecting the highest 
science value payload over a lower priority payload, is consistent with what is 
seen in "real life" as manifestors try to achieve the highest value manifest. In the 
case above, a simple ranking approach dictates that MGBX-01 be selected first 
since it is the only priority 1 payload. However, in our experiments the students 
consistently bid for CGBA-04 (science value of 70 and requiring 4 lockers), 
CPCG-07 (science value of 55 and requiring 1 locker) and CPCG-08 (science 
value of 45 and requiring 1 locker) since these payloads required the same 6 
lockers as MGBX-01 but had a greater science value (i.e., 170 instead of 100). 
This trade-off information becomes much more important for efficiency when the 
number of users and the number of variables increase.
Figure 4. Comparison of resources used in a simple ranking approach 
(with a serial dictator) and a market-based approach.
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The initial evaluation of our market-based system was inconclusive. The 
approach was to simply evaluate the aggregate use of resources, see figure 4. 
[15] All that could be stated was that a market-based system had a better 
utilization with middeck lockers and watt-hours, while a simple ranking approach 
provided a better crew-hour utilization. The reason this data was inconclusive 
was that nothing could be stated about which resources were more important. If 
crew-hours were the limiting resource then a simple ranking approach might be 
the better choice.
A second method for evaluating the data involved running the experiment for 
two planning periods. Each period involved six shuttle missions over the course 
of one simulated year. Thus, students first attempted to get as many of their 
payloads manifested on any of the six shuttles launched during year one. Any 
payloads not manifested or any points unspent were allowed to be carried over to 
the subsequent planning period. Prior to the start of the second planning,
Figure 5. Percent increase in science return for each user code using a 
market-based approach and their point carryovers from the first year to the 
second.
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Code U CodeS Code X Code F DoD
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students were given an additional budget of points to add to any of the points 
from the first planning period. They were than free to bid as they saw fit during 
year two.
The data for this is plotted in figure 5. Notice that each user (i.e., NASA 
Code) on the plot has three columns. The first column is the percent return in 
science value of a market-based system over a simple ranking approach for the 
first planning period (i.e., year one). The next column is the percent return for 
year two. The third column shows the total return over both planning periods.
Notice that only Code S (NASA Office of Space Science) and Code X 
(NASA Office of Space Access and Technology) had a decrease in science value 
for the first planning period. This would indicate that a simple ranking approach 
should be better than a market-based approach for those two users. However, if 
we look at the number of points carried over from planning period one to two for 
both Code S and X, we see a different story. Both users decided to carry their
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points from year one to year two to insure that their large payloads get 
manifested. This resulted from the fact that users received points (i.e., a budget) 
for each planning period. By carrying points to the next year, they ensured that 
they had more points than the other users and thus have a greater chance of out 
bidding them. Both user codes decided that it would be too expensive to try to 
get their large payloads manifested in year one. If we look at column three for all 
users we see that over the two-years, all users had an overall science value that 
was greater when compared with a simple ranking approach.
Thus, a market-based system for manifesting Space Shuttle secondary 
payloads was able to produce a manifest in a shorter amount of time and with 
fewer people. [16] It also usually produced a higher value manifest, but this was 
just another benefit of the system. Our goal was never to produce a better 
manifest, just a comparable one done in a shorter amount of time and with fewer 
individuals. A market-based system also could provide the information necessary 
to set a commercial price for middeck lockers as compared to the approach 
currently used by NASA. In addition, since the system is electronically based, 
the system is conducive to a space program that has participants geographically 
located around the world.
One problem with a market-based approach was that users did not know a 
priori how much to bid for a locker. This resulted from two facts. The first was 
the lack experience on the part of the users as to how much to bid. The second 
was that users always bid the least amount to out-bid someone else. This 
resulted from the system rule that if a payload was successfully manifested in 
one round, the bid could not be withdrawn during subsequent rounds. It could 
only be bumped by a higher bid. This was done to insure that the results were 
monotonic and that they would converge on a solution. As an example, if a user 
wanted to beat a payload that was manifested for 10 points, the user would 
usually bid only 11 points to outbid them. Since this is a controlled experiment, 
we knew what the optimum bid was to efficiently manifest the most high value 
payloads. If the optimum bid to insure being manifested was 81 points, there 
could be as many as 71 rounds to get to the optimum solution! Users had no
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idea of how much to bid so they always bid the minimum. If a market-based 
property-rights system was going to be used successfully to allocate resources, 
giving the users knowledge of how much to bid would have to be provided.
This work was presented to NASA's Office of Space Utilization to advance 
the experiments into the next phase of implementation. The next phase would 
be to develop a system that could be used at NASA's Headquarters in parallel 
with their current manual manifestor system. Unfortunately, a change of key 
personnel at headquarters placed the entire research endeavor on hold. The 
explanation put forth was that since most of the middeck lockers would be filled 
with space station hardware, very few lockers would be available for the other 
users. As such there was no need to change to a market-based system in the 
immediate future. Their recommendation was to approach the International 
Space Station about the possible use of a market-based system to solve their 
manifest issues. After all, as the number of lockers available to users on the 
Space Shuttle decreased, the number of lockers available on the Space Shuttle 
for International Space Station payloads increased.
V. Allocation of RADAR Observations during Earth Orbital Operations
In November 1997, the LightSAR pre-project asked if we could evaluate a 
market-based system that could be used as a cost-effective approach for 
allocating time on a planned Earth-orbiting RADAR satellite. The objective of this 
mission was to use new technologies to develop a Lightweight Synthetic 
Aperture RADAR (LightSAR) spacecraft that could be used both by the scientific 
community and commercial users.
Past RADAR missions all had the same type of challenge, namely an 
excessive demand for RADAR time to observe the Earth. That is demand by 
multiple users far exceeded the available amount of spacecraft time for collecting 
data. For these past missions, users would submit requests to select a RADAR 
instrument configuration (i.e., Dual Polarimetry, Interferometry, ScanSAR, Hi-Res 
Strip, or Spotlight), the time for target illumination, and the coordinates of the
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target. These requests would be submitted to mission planners to integrate into 
a single timeline of events. The mission planner's goal was to select only the 
highest priority requests, be fair to all users, and efficiently used the limited 
spacecraft resources.
Once the mission planners had produced a timeline, it would be presented 
to the user community. As is always the case, those users that had their RADAR 
"data takes" incorporated into the timeline were satisfied with the timeline. Those 
users that lost out were unhappy and appealed the decision. Appeals were 
always made since there was "nothing to lose" and everything to gain. 
Unfortunately there was something to lose. Individuals that appealed to get their 
request incorporated into the timeline invested their time and effort as well as 
those of the governing body that was given the responsibility of adjudicating 
conflicts. Once the appeal was presented, if it was lost the user had nothing to 
show for their effort. This type of loss is commonly referred to as a "Dead Weight 
Loss." To compound the problem, users typically make multiple appeals until 
they were successful or the time for making changes to the timeline was past. 
The question was, could a market-based property-rights system produce the 
same caliber of timeline with fewer people, in less time, and in a distributed 
manner? In addition, a better mechanism had to be found which would allow 
users to bid in a more efficient and natural manner.
The student experiments designed for LightSAR began with the system 
design for the Space Shuttle manifest problem. It had been shown that the 
shuttle system, without the priority classes, was well suited for this class of 
problem and was able to provide trade-off information that made the system very 
efficient.
With our LightSAR experiments, the problem of a more natural way to bid 
and how much to bid was addressed. As we saw with the shuttle experiments, 
users did not know a priori how much to bid for their requests. In addition, since 
accepted bids could not be retracted, users had an incentive not to overbid and 
submitted the lowest winning bid they could to obtain the desired resources. As
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stated previously, this approach produced numerous small bids and an excessive 
number of rounds.
To decrease the number of rounds required to reach a result, a market- 
based system with a Vickrey auction was used. [17] In a Vickrey-type of auction, 
the "winning" bid pays the runner-up price. Thus if user A bids 50 points and 
user B bids 75 points for the same resources, user B would win the resources but 
would only be debited 50 points from their account.
Vickrey auctions provide the incentive for users to be forthright about their 
requests. This can be seen in the following example; if user C wanted a 
particular set of resources but tried to under-bid for them (i.e., tried to acquire the 
resources for a small number of points), other user could bid for those same 
resources with an extremely high bid. Using a Vickrey auction, the high bidder 
would get the resources for the price set by the lower bid. Thus the only 
successful way to bid in a Vickrey auction is to bid the largest amount of points 
that a user would be willing to pay the first time. If out-bid by a second user, the 
only choice left to the user who lost the resources would be to a) consider 
increasing their bid, b) bid for a different set of resources, or c) carry the points 
forward to another planning period.
Figure 6 shows experimental results produced by a simple market-based 
system versus a market-based system with a Vickrey auction. The figure shows 
that both systems out performed a serial draft approach. In addition, a market- 
based system with a Vickrey auction approach out performed a simple market- 
based system by 2%. [18] Thus, a Vickrey auction not only out-performed a 
simple market-based system, but also arrives at a solution faster.
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Figure 6. Percent value increase of a simple market-based system and a 
market-based system with a Vickrey auction over a serial draft.
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To help users determine the correct amount of points to bid, priority levels 
were designed into our experiments. By defining priority levels (different concept 
then shuttle priority classes), users only had to specify the priority level of the 
request rather than the point total of each bid. A priority level has a number of 
points associated it. As such, a user just specified the data-takes priority and the 
system would determine the bid price. The priority level was established 
experimentally, for if set wrong the desired outcome would not be observed. As 
an example of this, if experimental data indicated that a bid of 81 was the 
optimum bid and the priority levels were set at:
Priority Level 5 = 0.1 point, 
Priority Level 4 = 0.2 points,
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Priority Level 3 = 0.3 points,
Priority Level 2 = 0.4 points,
Priority Level 1 = 0.5 points, and
Priority Level 0 = user specified bid.
then multiple rounds would still be needed to get the point total to the optimum 
bid of 81. Thus, having priority levels with point totals too close would not 
sufficiently reduce the number of rounds.
Conversely, if priority levels were set with point totals too far apart, the 
system would have too few rounds. As an example, if priority levels were set at:
Priority Level 5 = 0.1 point,
Priority Level 4 = 1 points,
Priority Level 3 = 10 points,
Priority Level 2 = 100 points,
Priority Level 1 = 1000 points, and
Priority Level 0 = user specified bid.
then there would not be enough points in a student's budget to select data takes 
with a priority level of 2 since students were only allocated 150 points per 
planning period.
We found experimentally that an approximate doubling of points per 
priority level produced satisfactory results. That is:
Priority Level 5 = 0.1 point,
Priority Level 4 = 0.5 points,
Priority Level 3 = 1 points,
Priority Level 2 = 2 points,
Priority Level 1 = 5 points, and
Priority Level 0 = user specified bid.
Once the priority levels were set, users just decided which type of data- 
take they wanted and the priority of the request. In addition, the bid was 
dependent on the amount of resources requested. As such, when a priority level 
was selected, the point bid total was calculated by multiplying the points 
associated with the priority by the amount of resources requested. Thus, a data-
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take requiring twice the duration of a particular request would calculate a bid that 
was twice the number of points. This provided the incentive for users to only 
request the resources that they needed for their data-take requests, and nothing 
more. The more resources requested, the more the request would cost.
Thus a market-based property-rights system with a Vickrey-type of auction 
had the benefit of producing the same caliber of timeline in a shorter amount of 
time and with fewer people. It also produced results in a fewer number of rounds 
than a market-based system where bid prices had to be submitted by the users. 
In addition, the bidding was more natural since users only had to select the 
priority of the request rather than trying to determine the bid price. Users in the 
space exploration community are always being requested to prioritize requests. 
As such, using this approach, some of the fear of using a market-based system 
was alleviated.
The major draw back of the LightSAR system was the user unfamiliarity 
with market-based systems. Users were able to increase their comfort with the 
system after participating in a few planning periods, but the result is very 
surprising. In the United States individuals live in a market-based system known 
as capitalism. Individuals make choices to exchange currency for a resources 
every day. However, applied to a space exploration problem that is usually 
solved with a committee process or by a serial dictator approach, individuals 
seem to lose all their expertise in such market-based systems. The only method 
for removing this issue appears to be by experience alone.
The LightSAR Project did endorse the market-based approach but had a 
much bigger problem to address. Since the mission was half science and half 
commercial, the Project had to find a commercial sponsor to fund the other half 
of the mission. Only than would NASA ask Congress to fund it. By the fall of 
1998, a commercial sponsor still had not been found. As such, funding for the 
mission was not included in NASA's budget.
VI. Manifest of Space Shuttles for the International Space Station
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The current application still pending experimental trials involved 
manifesting payloads for the International Space Station. The strength of our 
Space Shuttle results gave us the confidence to approach this multi-billion dollar 
endeavor. The difficulty for this market-based property-rights system design was 
compounded by the fact that payloads had to fit into the resource envelope 
provided by the International Space Station AND the Space Shuttle. This was 
driven by the fact that only those payloads that fit in Space Shuttle Middeck 
Lockers or in the Multi-Purpose Logistic Modules (MPLM) could be manifested 
for the station.
Figure 7. Space Shuttle and International Space Station resource 
envelope.
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In figure 7 we see the basic structure of the International Space Station 
problem. In this particular case only one Space Shuttle, Flight 7A.1, is scheduled 
to rendezvous with the station. The shuttle has a specific payload lift capability 
(i.e., 2267 kg. with 226 kg. in reserve), has the ability to store payloads in 4 
lockers with another 4 in reserve, or in 2 MPLMs with 2 in reserve. In addition 
the station can provide some electrical power for the payloads. Notice that the 
International Space Station has its own set of resources (i.e., Middeck Locker 
Equivalents, energy, and crew time).
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Like past allocation problems, the current system involved a large number 
of manifestors and a large number of meetings all designed to efficiently use the 
shuttle and station resources while being fair to all users. Another complexity of 
the International Space Station manifest problem is that there are two different 
sets of manifestors, those for the shuttle and those for the station. Thus, it is 
possible that shuttle manifestors might manifest a payload on to a shuttle that 
may not have the available station resources to operate the payload.
Figure 8. Results of manifesting Shuttle 7A.1 and the International Space 
Station.
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The work for this system design began in the spring of 2000. A prototype 
system was requested to be in place by the fall of 2000. Our approach was to 
use the Space Shuttle system with the fewest number of modifications. This was 
done to minimize costs since the International Space Station program had not 
allocated any funds to develop this planning tool. We believed that the strength 
of the prototype would convince them to fund the effort.
Results from this prototype market-based tool can be seen in figure 8. 
The top portion of the display indicates what payloads are currently at the station. 
Notice that the transportation costs for those payloads are all zero. The 
resources utilized by these payloads are first removed from the available station 
resources. The shuttle 7A.1 payloads, once docked with the station subtract their 
resource requirements from the remaining station resources. The last two lines 
of the figure shows the remaining resources left on Shuttle 7A.1 (as compared to 
its capacity) and the remaining station resources (as compared to its capacity). 
Notice that the shuttle had only 0.57 of a Middeck Locker left and no MPLMs, 
while the station still has plenty of resources available.
With a prototype system in place, the research effort was on hold pending 
the release of funds to develop a system that could be used by station 
manifestors. The one shown above was too simple to use in actuality. By the 
summer of 2001 funding for the International Space Station had still not been 
approved. Though managers believe in the system and its ability to solve their 
type of problem, work has been placed on hold until funding is released. More 
pressing International Space Station issues have superceded the issue of 
manifesting station payloads.
VII. Summary & Conclusion
This body of research involved the relatively new science of experimental 
economics and combined economists, engineers, and scientists to develop a 
new approach for solving space exploration allocation problems. In this 
endeavor, the economist contributed their knowledge of allocating scarce
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resources and their expertise in applying economic tools. The engineers 
contributed their knowledge of current techniques and approaches for solving the 
problems. Finally, the science community had the pivotal role of evaluating the 
results of the experiments. They also participated as willing subjects to validate 
the proof of concept for both the software design and the utility of the displays. 
Both a market-based property-rights and after-market systems were applied to 
solving a wide class of space exploration allocation problems. The research was 
performed in a laboratory setting to be able to vary initial conditions and to 
produce scientifically valid results. The combination of these disciplines, working 
together, was able to develop a systematic approach that to date has been 
beyond the grasp of any of the fields working alone.
The Cassini Resource Exchange could have been considered a fluke, but 
the success of market-based systems to a wide spectrum of allocation problems 
leads us to believe that the system was indeed capable of solving these classes 
of problems. In addition, our research was able to solve both initial allocation 
problems associated with an after-market type of system and the multi- 
dimensional problems associated with the bartering of resources. The CRE still 
represents the only successful application of these tools to a space exploration 
allocation problem. As previously stated, the tool was also successfully 
transferred from Cassini to the Air Quality Management District of Southern 
California's RECLAIM system. Roots of this system can be seen in the Kyoto 
Protocol for curbing the ever-increasing amount of greenhouse gas emissions.
With the Space Shuttle property-rights system, we successfully applied 
the techniques to solving shuttle manifest problems. This proved that a market- 
based system could solve these classes of problems even when restricted with 
the need for priority classes. The system was easy to use, produced superior 
results, required a smaller workforce, and was globally distributed. Its main 
attribute was that it put the individuals with the information in control of the 
system, namely the users themselves.
Finally we were able to remove the main technical problems of a market- 
based system. These problems involved finding an improved way to bid and a
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mechanism for reducing the number of rounds required to reach a solution. A 
Vickrey-type of auction coupled with using priority levels made a market-based 
property-rights system natural to use, increased the efficiency of the system, and 
increased the system's ability to find a locally optimized solution. The only 
remaining question is why is there such resistance to employing market-based 
systems to more space allocation problems?
The answer to this question appears to do more with the constituency that 
would support such a system than the approach itself. If we look at the user 
population, individuals that successfully produce above average results through 
the force of their demands, presentation skills, and appeals to management will 
never agree to change to another system. They already succeed with the current 
system and as such have no incentives to switch to a new system. Those 
individuals that consistently have below average results also are resistant to 
change. They have no guarantees that they will perform better with a new 
system but have to pay the penalty of learning a new one. Thus, from a user 
point of view, there are no reasons to change to a market-based system.
The only reason to attempt to use such a system comes from Project 
Management. This only occurs if the situation is desperate enough and the risk 
of mission failure so great that attempting a new innovative system appears as a 
reasonable risk. This is the only rationale that can explain the fact that Cassini 
used a market-based system for developing their science instruments but then 
would not even entertain the use of a market-based system for developing 
science timelines. All that can be said is that once in operations, there is no fear 
of mission cancellation. Since most observations planned in a science timeline 
will return a high science value, there is no incentive to aggravate the science 
community to increase the efficiency of their science planning process. After all, 
the science community will always state that they can do a much better job 
"working together" then in isolation bidding on the internet. Past historical data 
and experimental results shows us that this is not the case.
One limitation of market-based systems is that the resources being trading 
between users must be independent. The CRE involved 12 independent science
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instruments. As such, if the Visual & Infrared Mapping Spectrometer did a poor 
job trading, it would not effect the other investigations. However, in a dependent 
system, like designing a spacecraft, we see a different story. If the Attitude & 
Articulation Control Subsystem did a poor job trading and thus performed poorly, 
it wouldn't matter how good the Command & Data Handling Subsystem did, the 
overall spacecraft would not be able to meet the objectives of the mission.
Other factors that limit the utility of a market-based system are the number 
of users, the extent of the over-subscription of the resources, and the existence 
of known solutions. In the case of the number of users, the system gradually 
breaks down as the number of users approaches two. In the limiting case of two 
users, if one user wants to trade but the other does not, no trading occurs. A 
small number of users is referred to as a "thin" market and economic principles 
loose their meaning. A market to be viable must have enough individuals to 
obtain enough information about user demands. In our experiments, five users 
were a minimum in order to obtain satisfactory results. On the other hand, our 
limited experiments did not reveal any upper limit to the number of users the 
system could handle.
The extent to which the resources were over-subscribed is another factor. 
Market-based systems improve as the number of resources and the amount of 
demand increases. This results from the fact that many different combinations of 
demand exist, any of which may be used to optimize the system. Finally, even in 
an exceedingly over-subscribed system a known solution mitigates the need for a 
market-based approach. As an example, if multiple users would like to perform a 
RADAR observation over Java, all users would have to postpone their request if 
it was critical to the Project to image Mount Kelud in East Java prior to its 
eruption. In this case a solution already exists to which user will obtain the time to 
observe during the Java observing session. Thus, market-based systems are 
only needed when no prior solution pertaining to the allocation exists.
This research programme has been applied to Cassini instrument 
development, Space Shuttle secondary payload manifests, LightSAR mission 
planning, Mars 2001 Lander surface operations, Cassini science planning, and
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manifesting of International Space Station payloads. Only the Cassini instrument 
development effort was allowed to move from the experimental phase to an 
operational one. The cancellation of LightSAR and the Mars 2001 Lander 
missions by NASA did not help our cause. In addition, the large cost overruns in 
the International Space Station delegates our small research programme to the 
sidelines until the much large station issues can be solved. Cassini has also 
tentatively agreed to consider using an after-market approach once their initial 
allocation of resource for their 4-year science tour is fully planned. Even the 
Deep Space Network is considering re-examining a market-based property-rights 
system for allocating time on their experimental Deep Space Station #13.
Thus, this research has shown that a market economy is far better suited 
to solving space exploration resource allocation problems than the currently 
employed command economy approach. Market-based systems provide 
information about the relative importance of one particular resource over another, 
reveals trade-off information, and returns the decision-making process back to 
the individuals who should be making the decisions (i.e., the users themselves).
It would be exceedingly interesting for a future research programme to 
explore the project management, project staff, and science communities' 
continued resistance to move away from their historical command economy 
approach for solving resource allocation problems. The command economy 
approach has led to successive overruns that have characterized the field of 
astronautics since the dawn of the space age. Hopefully this research 
programme would lead to a course of action for making the transition to a market 
economy successful.
However, the author believes that only when three successful applications 
(not experiments) have been achieved covering three different types of problems 
(e.g., instrument development, science planning, payload manifests, etc.) will 
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